Alan Thomas, ‘A Life of Virtue or a Life of Principle?’, Manchester Metropolitan University, June 19, 2014

 Particularism in Bioethics, Professional Ethics and Medicine

19 June Workshop Schedule

9.00 – 9.30 Welcome and Registration

9.30 – 10.45 Ulrik Kilhbom (Uppsala): ‘Doing Particularized Bioethics and the Shape of Context’

10.45 – 11.00 Tea and Coffee

11.00 – 12.00 Steve Edwards (Swansea): ‘Moral Realism in Health Care’

12.00 – 13.00 Per Nortvedt (Oslo, UiO): ‘Particularism, Principlism and Professional Evil Doing’

13.00 – 14.00 Lunch

14.00 – 15.15 Alan Thomas (Tilburg): ‘A Life of Virtue or a Life of Principle?’

15.15 – 16.00 Anne Raustol (Oslo, Diakonhjemmet): ‘Partiality and Impartiality in Nursing’

16.00 – 16.15 Tea and Coffee

16.15 – 17.00 Benedict Smith (Durham): ‘Particularism and Persons’

17.00 – 17.45 Anna Bergqvist (MMU): ‘Particularism and Person Centred Medicine’

17.45 – 18.30 Roundtable Discussion, featuring invited contributions from Dr Michael Loughlin (MMU Cheshire) and Dr Emma Bullock (KCL) among others.

18.30 Workshop Close

19.30 Formal Dinner

 


Alan Thomas ‘Epistemic Justice, Steadiness of Mind and Self-Deception’, Oxford April 2nd 2014 11:55 – 12:45

‘Epistemic Justice, Steadiness of Mind and Self-Deception’

Ethics of Cognition Project

Workshop: the Ethics of Self-Deception

Ryle Room, Faculty of Philosophy, Radcliffe Observatory Quarter

Abstract

This paper develops a general characterisation of epistemic wrongs as forms of derogation before characterising specifically epistemic injustices as putative disqualifications of an interlocutor from the status of knower. The account is related to Williams’s discussion of the generic epistemic virtues of Sincerity, Accuracy and the role of the third person in “steadying the mind”. There is a constitutive connection between sociality and the individual epistemic vice of self-deception.  The connection between this account and Williams’s liberal political psychology is, in turn, explained via the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination.


April 30, 2014, 16:30 – 18:00 David Brink (San Diego) ‘Eudaimonism and Cosmopolitan Concern’

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Professor of Philosophy, University of San Diego,

Director, Institute for Law and Philosophy University of San Diego School of Law

Location: Dante Building Room 5

Abstract

This talk explores the adequacy of Sidgwick’s contrast between the egocentrism of ancient ethics and the impartiality of modern ethics by evaluating the resources of eudaimonists, especially Aristotle and the Stoics, to defend a cosmopolitan conception of the common good.  The adequacy of various eudaimonist defenses of the common good may depend on our conception of the common good.  Adapting Broad’s comparison of egoism, utilitarianism, and self-referential altruism, we might distinguish between the scope and weight of ethical concern.  We might then distinguish ethical conceptions that are parochial with respect to both scope and weight, conceptions that are cosmopolitan with respect to both scope and weight, and mixed conceptions that combine universal scope and variable weight.  Aristotle’s eudaimonist justification of the common good appears doubly parochial.  By contrast, the Stoics offer a eudaimonist defense of the common good that is purely cosmopolitan.  But the Stoics have trouble providing a eudaimonist defense of a cosmopolitan conception of the common good.  However, Aristotelian eudaimonism has resources to justify a mixed cosmopolitan conception of the common good that combines universal scope and variable weight.  If Broad’s reservations about Sidgwick’s utilitarianism are correct, mixed cosmopolitanism may be cosmopolitanism enough.


April 9, 16:30 – 18:00 Christine Tiefensee (Bamberg) ‘A Dilemma for Metaethical Inferentialists’

Christine_Foto_02

Abstract

It has recently been suggested that metaethical debate must be fundamentally re-framed. Instead of carving out metaethical differences in representational terms, appealing to notions such as truth, belief and representation, Matthew Chrisman in particular has argued that metaethics should be given an inferentialist footing. In this talk, I will cast doubt on Chrisman’s proposal by confronting metaethical inferentialists with the following dilemma: Either, they stay true to inferentialism but cannot save the metaethical differences. Or they succeed in putting metaethical demarcation lines back into place, but now end up merely rehashing orthodox metaethical debates, rather than providing a novel approach to metaethics. I will conclude by considering what we can learn from this dilemma about the dialectic behind the development of inferentialist metaethics.


Wednesday, March 26th 2014, 16:30 – 18:00 Tom Bates, University of Leiden

‘Mixed versus Moderate Traits: On the Evaluative Status of Empirically Sound Character’

Location: CZ 118

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Abstract

In a recent pair of books Christian Miller has argued for an empirically robust theory of moral character, which he calls the ‘Mixed Traits’ view. These traits are mixed in the sense that they have a mixed evaluative valence, a rather novel idea which does not clearly match with a pre-theoretical view of character. In this paper I will argue that the challenge of squaring psychological findings about personality and behaviour with pre-theoretical ideas about moral character does not require such a radical account. The challenge of situationism can be met if we give consideration to the role of moderate character traits. I will show why moderate traits can meet the empirical challenge, and why this model is preferable to the mixed traits account. 

 


The Moral and Political Legacy of Bernard Williams – Oxford University 21st-22nd April, 2014

 

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Venue:

University of Oxford Faculty of Philosophy,

Lecture Room

Radcliffe Humanities

Radcliffe Observatory Quarter

Woodstock Road

Oxford OX2 6GG

 

Organiser:

 Lorenzo Greco

EC Marie Curie Fellow in Philosophy, University of Oxford

Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy, Mansfield College, Oxford

Early Career Fellow, The Oxford Research Centre in the Humanities

Registration is free. If you plan to attend, and for any further questions please email

lorenzo.greco [at] philosophy.ox.ac.uk

 

The conference is funded by The Mind Association, with the collaboration of The Oxford Research Centre in the Humanities

PROGRAMME

21st April

2:30 p. m. – 3:30 p. m. Miranda Fricker: “The Humanistic Discipline”

3:30 p. m. – 4:30 p. m. Timothy Chappell: “Recognising Reasons”

4:30 p. m. – 5:00 p. m. Break

5:00 p. m. – 6:30 p. m. Nakul Krishna: “Alternatives to Moral Theory”

Elianna Fetterolf: “Remorse beyond the Morality System”

Adrian Moore: “Replies to Nakul Krishna and Elianna Fetterolf

22nd April

9:30 a. m. – 10:45 a. m. Simon Blackburn: “Bernard Williams, Adam Smith, and the Peculiar Piacular”

10:45 a. m. – 11:15 a. m. Break

11:15 a. m. – 12:15 a. m. Roger Crisp: “D’où Venons Nous … Que Sommes Nous … Où Allons Nous? Williams on Moral Luck”

2:00 p. m. – 3:00 p. m. Alan Thomas: “Williams’s Political Psychology: Between Moralism and Realism?”

3:00 p. m. – 4:00 p. m. Edward Harcourt: “The Morality System and ‘The Idea of Equality’”

4:00 p. m. – 4: 30 p. m. Break

4:30 p. m. – 5:30 p. m. Paul Russell: “Hume, Williams, and ‘the Morality System’”

Conference ends


Tuesday March 11 2014, 16:30 – 18:00 Enzo Rossi, Amsterdam

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‘Libertarianism and Capitalism: A Reality Check’

Enzo Rossi

Department of Politics

University of Amsterdam

Location Dante Building Room 10.


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