‘Love and Attachment’
Edward Harcourt, Keble College, Oxford
‘Mental Dispositions and Environmental Dependence’
Virtue ethics predominantly assumes that ethical development involves cultivating character traits as reliable mental dispositions towards practical wisdom. Situationist authors claim that evidence from social psychology discredits possibility of such dispositions; rather than focus on character traits, it is better to concentrate on our situational dependence. However, the juxtaposition between practical wisdom and situational dependence relies upon tenuous, internalistic assumptions from within the philosophy of mind. Beginning with Sartre’s rejection of the internality of consciousness, one can construct an account of mental dispositions that incorporates environmental dependence so as to deflate the rivalry between situationism and virtue ethics.
From January 1 2013 the ethics research group forms the ethics stream of the new Tilburg Institute for Logic, Ethics and the Philosophy of Science. Meetings in the group will take place alongside the seminars in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science and Logic and Language.
The Spring seminars in Ethics will be as follows:
February 20th, Wednesday 16:45 – 18:30 DZ 119 Sean Gould (Tilburg) Title tbc
March 19th TUESDAY 16:00 – 18:00 DZ152 Edward Harcourt (Oxford) Title tbc
March 27th Wednesday 16:45 – 18:30 DZ119 John van Houdt (Tilburg) ‘A Syntax of Action: Rationality and Fichte’s Aufforderung‘
April 17th Wednesday 16:45 – 18:30 DZ152 Alan Thomas (Tilburg) ‘McDowell on Transcendental Arguments, Scepticism and Error Theory’
John McDowell has recently argued that his earlier attempt therapeutically to dissolve the challenge from scepticism needs revision. We can, instead, go sufficiently deeply into the sceptic’s motivations to identify assumptions that she makes that offer the basis for a transcendental argument that undermines radical scepticism about our knowledge of the external world. In this new strategy McDowell’s disjunctivism (non-conjunctivism) now plays a local and tactical role. This paper examines this change of strategy and argues that the only puzzle about McDowell’s position is the “modesty” he claims for his results. An analogy is described between McDowell’s case against the sceptic and one response to an error theory about ethics. A general commitment to interpretationism shows that the interpretation of all ethical thought and talk as truth-apt, but globally false, is unstable. Similarly, the sceptic’s description of all our perceptual states as apt to be perceptual knowledge, but globally false, is unstable. Scepticism arises from the original description of our epistemic situation as a predicament; as resting on a failure to appreciate that there is a class of mental states for which the idea of “having the world in view” is constitutive of the class.
May 1st Wednesday 16:45 – 18:30 DZ152 Machteld Geuskens (Tilburg) ‘Truth and Trust: the Paradox of the Two Basic Epistemic Relations.
June 11 TUESDAY 10:00 – 18:00 One Day Workshop with Richard Moran (Harvard) The Ruth First Room. Speakers: Machteld Geuskens, Edward Harcourt, Valerie Aucouturier, Sophie Djigo, Filip Buekens, Kathryn Brown, Alan Thomas