Kindle edition now available:
UK publication (hardback) December 1
US publication (hardback) December 6
Call For Participation: Conference on Republic of Equals: Predistribution and Property-owning Democracy
Invited key-note speaker: Professor Alan Thomas
When: 24 October 2016
Where: University of Minho, Braga (Portugal)
This conference will discuss some of the central themes of Alan Thomas’s book Republic of Equals: Predistribution and Property-owning Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2016).
Possible topics for submissions include:
– the relationship between liberal and republican traditions in political thought;
– whether political philosophy can address the ‘New Inequality’ in affluent Western Societies from the 1970s to the present day;
– whether a property-owning democracy is a realistic utopian ideal;
– whether processes of globalisation constrain egalitarian projects;
– the contrast between property-owning democracy and welfare state capitalism;
– the relationship between property-owning democracy and market socialism;
– the relationship between capitalist forms of economic organization and oligarchic forms of governance.
– the relationship between predistribution and redistribution;
– the relationship between basic income and reciprocity, …
Abstracts of between 300 to 500 words on any of these topics (or related topics) should be submitted to Roberto Merrill (firstname.lastname@example.org) by August 25.
Notification of acceptance: September 1.
It is anticipated that presentations at the conference will be 20 minutes long with 20 minutes reserved for discussion.
NB: The book may be out by the time of the conference (the current plan is October) but Professor Alan Thomas will certainly have the page proofs with correct pagination, which will be available for participants.
Participation fee: 20 euros
This event is organized by the Political Theory Group of CEHUM, University of Minho (Braga),
Contact: Roberto Merrill (email@example.com)
Thursday, May 12, 16:30
Prisma Building Room 50
Emotions figure in many areas of public life, and a number of pressing ethical and political issues invite us to think about emotions and their relationship to reason. Emotions, however, are all too rarely studied conceptually, with the result that both political theory and practice are often left at a loss. In this talk, I want to examine the emotion of fear and how it has been used in appeals for political reform. In particular, I will look at the welfare reform mechanism of a Universal Basic Income, or Citizen’s Income: an unconditional, automatic, non-means-tested income paid to all members of a political community regardless of other income earned, which is intended to replace a score of means-tested welfare payments, such as unemployment benefits. Arguments in support of a Citizens’ Income often focus on the freedom from fear, anxiety, and uncertainty such an initiative would offer. The idea is that this would not simply be better for well-being, but further could actually increase productivity via the capacity for creative problem-solving and innovation fear impedes. These arguments, however, are made seemingly without consideration of the empirical or theoretical research we have on fear. Here, I draw on the philosophy and cognitive science of fear to evaluate whether the “freedom from fear” argument can deliver what its proponents want.
16:45 – 18:00 Dante 005
‘The Intended Consequences of Intention‘
This paper develops a reading of Anscombe’s Intention which sees it as the product of the ethical debates in which Anscombe was engaged between 1956 and 1958, in particular, her opposition to Harry S. Truman’s honorary degree from Oxford University, and her public critique of ‘the spirit of the age’ in her BBC Radio talk ‘Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt the Youth?’). Through those debates Anscombe came to realise that moral philosophy had lost sight of the distinctive use of the question ‘What is she doing?’, to mark out the class of intentional actions (Intention, sss23, 37). This question, as she saw it, is essential to identifying the nature and quality of an act, a category without which moral philosophy cannot precede.
Once we re-frame Intention as a corrective to this oversight, two things become clear. First, that the widespread view of Intention as offering a novel account of action is mistaken; rather, the insight of Intention “isn’t a philosophical thesis at all” (Anscombe, ‘Under a Description’); second, that that the consequences of Intention for ethics are yet to be appreciated.
Owing to the ongoing travel disruption in Brussels following the terrorist attacks on March 22 this event has been postponed. The meeting on the 23rd is cancelled and will be re-scheduled.
Title: ‘Conscious Exotica’
Venue: Dante Building Room 003
Professor Murray Shanahan is Professor of Cognitive Robotics at Imperial College, London, the author of The Technological Singularity and was the scientific advisor to the film ‘Ex Machina’. In his talk he will discuss consciousness and AI:
In the film Ex Machina, Caleb comes to see the robot Ava as a conscious being by interacting with her. In Wittgensteinian terms, it is not so much that he forms the opinion that she is no mere automaton. Rather, he comes to adopt the same attitude towards her that he takes towards a fellow conscious creature. However, in one sense this is an easy step to take. Her behaviour is very human-like. But suppose we encountered an exotic complex dynamical system – an extraterrestrial intelligence, say, or a sophisticated AI that has undergone a great deal of evolution or self-modification – something utterly alien. Could we determine whether or not that system, or any part of it, was conscious? Could we establish whether or not it was morally acceptable to experiment on the system, to destroy it, or to turn it off? Do these questions even make sense?
‘Mental Health’ and Human Excellence
Wednesday 17th February
Dante Building Room 006
The paper concerns two familiar lines of inquiry: one, stemming from a neo-Aristotelian naturalism associated with Foot and others, asks whether we can derive a catalogue of human excellences from what humans need in order to be some way. The second asks whether (as Plato said) virtue is a kind of health, and vice a kind of illness. The first is often seen as a failure to the extent that it does not enable us to derive a list of moral virtues. But the concept of human excellence is many-layered, so the fact that Foot’s approach may not succeed for moral virtues does not show that it is no good for anything. The kinds of psychological characteristic derived from a more liberal application of Foot’s approach may also help to give non-trivial answers to the second, Platonic line of inquiry.